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In three of the major right to marry cases in which the plaintiffs 
challenged their domicile’s refusal to permit them to marry, the couples 
had married in a sister state in accord with local law. In none of these 
cases did the Court address the conditions under which states, as a 
constitutional matter, must recognize marriages validly celebrated in 
another state. This article argues that the position reflected in the First 
and Second Restatements of the Conflicts of Law captures the United 
States Constitution’s approach. A marriage valid in the states of 
celebration and domicile at the time of its celebration must be recognized 
throughout the country, contrary policy of the forum state 
notwithstanding. In addition, the article discusses both the conditions 
under which states must permit the enjoyment of the incidents of 
marriage, and some of the changes in state law that would be necessary 
were the Court to expressly adopt the position advocated here. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Three of the major right-to-marry cases decided by the United 
States Supreme Court—Loving v. Virginia,1 Zablocki v. Redhail,2 and 
Obergefell v. Hodges3—implicated an issue that nevertheless remains 
unresolved: under what conditions does the Constitution require 
marriages validly celebrated in one state to be recognized by all other 
states? In each of these cases, the Court struck down a state’s contested 
marriage prohibition, which removed the conflict between that state’s 
law and the laws of other states who allowed such marriages, and 
thereby allowed the Court to avoid determining how such conflicts 
should be resolved. 
Merely because no conflicts were posed in these cases, however, 
does not mean that conflicts never arise. On the contrary, states have 
long been forced to develop approaches to deciding whether to 
recognize marriages validly celebrated elsewhere that nonetheless 
contravene local law. As one example, a state of domicile might be 
forced to decide whether to recognize a marriage between individuals 
too closely related by blood according to that state’s law,4 even though 
 
 1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 2. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 3. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 4. See, e.g., Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing whether to 
recognize a marriage between first cousins, which was valid in the state of celebration (Tennessee) 
but prohibited in the state of domicile (Indiana)); see also Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206 
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such marriages are permitted in the state of celebration.5 The 
Restatements (First and Second) of the Conflicts of Law provide 
guidance as to how such matters should be resolved.6 However, the 
Court has never explicitly addressed whether the Restatements’ basic 
approach is constitutionally required, forcing lower courts to interpret 
the Constitution’s limits and resulting in the adoption of inconsistent 
approaches among jurisdictions.7 The Court’s implicit position is that 
the Restatements’ approach, with a few important modifications, 
reflects the marriage recognition requirements of the Constitution.8 
Part I of this article discusses the fundamental right to marry, as well 
as the conditions under which states will choose to recognize marriages 
validly celebrated elsewhere. This Part also discusses the constitutional 
limitations placed on states in deciding whether to recognize the 
validity of a marriage celebrated elsewhere, as well as whether to 
prohibit couples married elsewhere from enjoying the incidents of 
marriage. Part II applies the constitutional limitations discussed in Part 
I, demonstrating how these limitations render some state laws and 
practices unconstitutional and hence unenforceable. The article 
concludes by arguing that the Court should explicitly recognize the 
constitutional constraints it has implicitly endorsed. Doing so would 
manifest appropriate respect for both state sovereignty and the 
fundamental interest in marriage, promote certainty about marital 
 
(Ohio 1958) (discussing whether to recognize a first cousin marriage valid in the state of 
celebration (Massachusetts) but prohibited in the state of domicile (Ohio)).  
 5. The state where the couple celebrates their marriage is the state of celebration, see 
Christopher S. Krimmer, Federal Benefits for Married Same-Sex Couples, 87 WIS. LAW. 39, 40 
(Jan. 2014) (describing the “place of celebration” as “the jurisdiction in which the marriage took 
place or was celebrated”), while the state where the couple is living and plans to remain 
permanently is the state of domicile, see MAUREEN MCBRIEN & PATRICIA A. KINDREGAN, THE 
MEANING OF DOMICILE IN DIVORCE PRACTICE, 2 MASS. PRAC., FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 29:2 (4th ed.). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19(a) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1971) [hereafter SECOND RESTATEMENT] (noting that “a domicil, once established, 
continues until a new one is acquired”). 
 6. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 121, 131, 132 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) 
[hereafter FIRST RESTATEMENT]; SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 283. 
 7. Compare Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 976 (Md. 2012) (“Generally, Maryland courts will 
honor foreign marriages as long as the marriage was valid in the state where performed.”) with 
Oliver v. Stufflebeam, 155 So. 3d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (upholding state refusal to 
recognize same-sex marriage validly celebrated in another domicile) and Mabry v. Mabry, 882 
N.W.2d 539, 540 (Mich. 2016) (McCormack, J., dissenting) (“Until 2015, same-sex couples were 
not permitted to marry in Michigan. Nor did Michigan recognize a legal marriage between 
a same-sex couple solemnized in another jurisdiction.”). 
 8. Cf. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) (“Marriages not polygamous or 
incestuous, or otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of the state where 
entered into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction.”). Here, the Court does not make 
clear whether it is describing a state practice or a constitutional mandate. Id.  
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status, and remove the guesswork about whether citizens would be 
sacrificing their marriages when visiting or moving to a particular state. 
I. MARRIAGE RECOGNITION RIGHTS 
The right to marry involves a fundamental interest, and the United 
States Constitution constrains the power of states to prohibit marriage 
on certain bases. However, states continue to differ with respect to 
certain regulations, e.g., who is barred from marrying because too 
closely related by affinity or consanguinity.9 A couple who marries in 
accord with local law might think twice about moving to or visiting a 
state which bars their marriage, fearing that were some accident to 
occur in the latter state, the two would be treated as legal strangers and 
thus unable to avail themselves of the special status accorded to 
spouses when making hospital visits or health care decisions.10 Such a 
couple might want to know before going within a state’s borders the 
conditions, if any, under which their marriage would not be recognized. 
States have adopted their own approaches to deciding which 
marriages that could not be celebrated locally will nonetheless be 
recognized; those approaches are reflected in the Restatements (First 
and Second) of the Conflicts of Law.11 While the Court has not stated 
whether these approaches are constitutionally required, the Court’s 
existing constitutional jurisprudence strongly suggests that a marriage 
valid in the state of domicile at the time of the marriage must be 
recognized throughout the country. 
Section A of Part I discusses right-to-marry cases where the 
plaintiffs married in one state and then brought suit against their 
domiciles, claiming that their domicile’s refusal to permit the couples 
to marry (or to recognize the marriage they had celebrated elsewhere) 
violated federal constitutional guarantees. Section B addresses the 
 
 9. Compare Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-106 (West) (“All marriages between . . . 
first cousins are declared to be incestuous and absolutely void.”) with 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
5/212(a)(4) (2014) (prohibiting marriages between first cousins unless both parties are older than 
50 years of age or one party is permanently and irreversibly sterile) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-
3-101 (West) (prohibiting marriages between various ancestral relations, including between linear 
ancestors or descendants of a party, and between a grandparent and a grandchild). 
 10. Cf. Damien Rios, Estate and Tax Planning Considerations for Same-Sex Couples, 39 EST. 
PLAN. 9, 11 (May 2012) (“Not only is the same-sex [not legally recognized] spouse not legally 
permitted to make medical decisions for the incapacitated individual, unless appointed to do so 
under a health care proxy, but he or she might not be permitted to visit the individual in 
the hospital during visiting hours that are restricted to family members.”). 
 11. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 121 (explaining that state and local law 
determines the validity of a marriage); SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 283. 
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Restatements’ positions on when marriages validly celebrated in one 
state must be recognized in another. Section C includes a discussion of 
the effect of evasion statutes. Section D discusses the extent to which 
the Court has interpreted the Constitution to incorporate the 
Restatements’ positions. The Restatements not only discuss whether 
marriages validly celebrated elsewhere must be recognized, but also 
whether states must permit couples to enjoy the incidents of marriage. 
Section E explains the difference between status recognition and 
incident enjoyment, as well as some of the constitutional limitations on 
the power of states to refuse to permit married couples to enjoy those 
incidents. Finally, Section F discusses how federal right to travel 
guarantees may affect the constitutionality of state practices regarding 
marital status and the enjoyment of marriage benefits. 
A. Right to Marry Caselaw 
Three of the important cases establishing the contours of the 
Constitution’s fundamental right to marry involved individuals who 
had married outside of their state of domicile12 and then challenged 
their domicile’s refusal to recognize their union.13 Because local 
statutes prohibited the respective couples from marrying at home,14 
they wed in states permitting their marriages and then claimed that 
their respective domicile’s prohibition violated constitutional 
 
 12. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (“Two years ago, Obergefell and Arthur 
decided to commit to one another, resolving to marry before Arthur died. To fulfill their mutual 
promise, they traveled from Ohio to Maryland, where same-sex marriage was legal. It was difficult 
for Arthur to move, and so the couple were wed inside a medical transport plane as it remained 
on the tarmac in Baltimore.”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 n.9 (1978) (“Counsel for 
appellee informed us at oral argument that appellee was married in Illinois some time after 
argument on the merits in the District Court, but prior to judgment.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (“In June 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and 
Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws.”). 
 13. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (citing MICH. CONST., ART. I, § 25; KY. CONST. § 233A; 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01) (Lexis 2008); TENN. CONST., ART. XI, § 18) (“These cases 
come from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, States that define marriage as a union 
between one man and one woman.”); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 382 (“[A]ppellee’s individual claim is 
unaffected, since he is still a Wisconsin resident and the Illinois marriage is consequently void 
under the provisions of §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5).”); Loving, 388 U.S. at 4 (“Other central provisions 
in the Virginia statutory scheme are § 20-57, which automatically voids all marriages between ‘a 
white person and a colored person’ without any judicial proceeding.”). 
 14. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (discussing Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee 
provisions which barred same-sex marriage); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375 (describing the Wisconsin 
statute §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) which made it very difficult if not impossible for certain indigents to 
marry); Loving, 388 U.S. at 4 (describing Virginia statutes §§ 20-57, 20-58, and 20-59 which barred 
interracial marriage). 
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guarantees.15 In each case, the Court discussed why the right to marry 
is of such “fundamental importance”16 and then held that the state 
could not prohibit the marriage at issue.17 These holdings did nothing 
to clarify the conditions, if any, under which the Constitution might 
permit a state of domicile to refuse to recognize a marriage valid under 
the law of the state of celebration. 
The first case, Loving v. Virginia, involved an interracial couple 
domiciled in Virginia.18 Because Virginia had a statute prohibiting 
interracial marriages, the couple traveled to the District of Columbia to 
be lawfully married.19 At the time, Virginia also had an evasion statute, 
which specified that interracial couples who married in another state 
would be treated as if they had tried to marry in-state, and the marriage 
would be void.20 
The Loving Court did not address whether the marriage validly 
celebrated in the District of Columbia had to be recognized in Virginia, 
instead holding that Virginia itself was not free to prohibit interracial 
marriage.21 While much of the opinion discussed why Virginia’s ban 
violated equal protection guarantees, the Court also addressed the right 
to marry itself, describing marriage as “one of the ‘basic civil rights of 
man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”22  
 
 15. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (discussing the claim that the state’s statute violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 376 (same); Loving, 388 U.S. at 1 (same). 
 16. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383. See also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 (discussing “the 
transcendent importance of marriage”); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (describing marriage as a “vital 
personal right”). 
 17. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (“[S]ame-sex couples may exercise the fundamental 
right to marry in all States.”); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (“When a statutory classification 
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is 
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those 
interests.”); id. at 390–91 (“The statutory classification created by §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) . . . cannot 
be justified by the interests advanced in support of it.”); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial 
discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another 
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).  
 18. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 4 (“If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose 
of being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards 
return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife . . . the marriage shall be governed by the 
same law as if it had been solemnized in this State.” (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-58)); see also 
id. (“Virginia [statute] . . . § 20-57 . . . automatically voids all marriages between ‘a white person 
and a colored person’ without any judicial proceeding.”).  
 21. Id. at 12 (“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of 
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”). 
 22. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)) (“The 
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the 
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Given the importance of marriage and the lack of a “legitimate 
overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination” to 
justify the ban,23 Virginia’s prohibition did not pass constitutional 
muster.24 This meant that Virginia was constitutionally required to both 
permit interracial couples to celebrate their marriages in Virginia and 
to recognize interracial marriages celebrated outside of Virginia, so 
long as the marriages met Virginia’s other marriage requirements.25 In 
holding that this particular marriage ban was unconstitutional, there 
was no need for the Court to address whether a marriage celebrated in 
the District of Columbia in accord with local law had to be recognized 
in Virginia, notwithstanding a valid Virginia law prohibiting the 
celebration of such marriages. 
The second right-to-marry case, Zablocki v. Redhail, involved a 
Wisconsin law prohibiting noncustodial parents from marrying if they 
were unable to meet their child support obligations.26 Like Virginia, 
Wisconsin had an evasion statute, although this one treated all 
marriages prohibited under local law as void, even if those marriages 
had been validly celebrated in another state.27 
When Redhail sought to marry his pregnant fiancée, he owed over 
$3700 in back child support.28 Barred from marrying in Wisconsin, 
 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”)). The Court’s glowing description of marriage echoed 
its opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut two years earlier: “Marriage is . . . intimate to the degree 
of being sacred [and] . . . is an association that promotes a way of life . . . a harmony in living . . . 
a bilateral loyalty . . . [that] is . . . for as noble a purpose as any involved in [the Court’s] prior 
decisions.” 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
 23. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
 24. See id. at 12 (“To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the 
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the 
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s 
citizens of liberty without due process of law.”). 
 25. Virginia also required, for example, that the marriage participants be of age, VA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-48 (West 2016), not too closely related by affinity or consanguinity, id. § 20-38.1(a), and 
competent to consent, id. § 20-45.1(b).  
 26. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (“Under the challenged statute, no 
Wisconsin resident in the affected class may marry in Wisconsin or elsewhere without a court 
order.”). 
 27. Id. at 382 n.9 (“[H]e is still a Wisconsin resident and the Illinois marriage is consequently 
void under the provisions of §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5).” (citing State v. Mueller, 171 N.W.2d 414 (Wis. 
1969))). See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.04 (1) (West) (“If any person residing and intending to 
continue to reside in this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the 
laws of this state goes into another state or country and there contracts a marriage prohibited or 
declared void under the laws of this state, such marriage shall be void for all purposes in this state 
with the same effect as though it had been entered into in this state.”). 
 28. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 379 (“[A]ppellee and the woman he desired to marry were 
expecting a child in March 1975 and wished to be lawfully married before that time . . . . [A]s of 
December 1974 there was an arrearage in excess of $3,700.”). 
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Redhail and his fiancée wed in Illinois.29 This case seemed to place the 
constitutionality of a domicile’s refusal to recognize a marriage validly 
celebrated elsewhere squarely before the Court. To see why, assume 
that Wisconsin’s law preventing domiciliaries from marrying if they had 
outstanding child support obligations passed constitutional muster. In 
that event, a marriage celebrated in accord with the law of the state of 
celebration (Illinois) would nonetheless not have to be recognized in 
the domicile (Wisconsin), assuming that Wisconsin’s refusal to 
recognize the marriage passed constitutional muster. 
Rather than address the interstate recognition issues, the Zablocki 
Court focused on the importance of the right to marry, noting that it 
makes “little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other 
matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the 
relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”30 The 
Court then held that the Constitution precluded Wisconsin from 
prohibiting marriages of individuals who had unpaid child support 
obligations.31 As had been true in Loving, the Zablocki holding 
eliminated the conflict between the laws of the states of celebration and 
domicile, obviating any need to address whether the Constitution 
would require Wisconsin to recognize a marriage prohibited locally 
when that marriage had been celebrated in accord with the law of a 
neighboring state. 
Obergefell v. Hodges, another right to marry case, involved a 
challenge to same-sex marriage bans in Ohio and other states.32 James 
Obergefell and John Arthur, Ohio domiciliaries, celebrated a marriage 
in Maryland, which permitted same-sex marriage.33 Ohio refused to 
recognize the marriage,34 not because of an evasion statute, but because 
 
 29. Id. at 382 n.9 (“Counsel for appellee informed us at oral argument that appellee was 
married in Illinois some time after argument on the merits in the District Court, but prior to 
judgment.”). 
 30. Id. at 383–84, 386. 
 31. See id. at 391 (affirming the lower court’s decision to invalidate the state’s prohibition). 
 32. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (“These cases come from Michigan, 
Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee . . . . The petitioners claim the respondents violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have their marriages, lawfully performed 
in another State, given full recognition.”). 
 33. Id. at 2594 (“[T]hey traveled from Ohio to Maryland, where same-sex marriage was 
legal . . . . [T]he couple were wed inside a medical transport plane as it remained on the tarmac in 
Baltimore.”). 
 34. Id. at 2594–95 (“Ohio law does not permit Obergefell to be listed as the surviving spouse 
on Arthur’s death certificate. By statute, they must remain strangers even in death . . . . 
Obergefell . . . brought suit to be shown as the surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate.”). 
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Ohio had a constitutional amendment preventing the celebration or 
recognition of same-sex marriages.35 
Like its predecessor Courts, the Obergefell Court extolled the 
importance of marriage: 
Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers 
unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. 
Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found 
alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. 
Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our 
most profound hopes and aspirations.36 
The Obergefell Court held that federal constitutional guarantees 
preclude states from prohibiting same-sex marriage.37 As in Loving38 
and Zablocki,39 this meant there was no longer a conflict between the 
laws of the states of celebration and domicile. 
However, part of the Obergefell analysis did focus on the individual 
harms that might be caused by a state’s refusal to recognize a marriage 
valid elsewhere.40 “Being married in one State but having that valid 
marriage denied in another,” the Court explained, “is one of ‘the most 
perplexing and distressing complication[s]’ in the law of domestic 
relations.”41 The Court noted that numerous foreseeable difficulties 
might occur. For example, “even an ordinary drive into a neighboring 
State to visit family or friends risks causing severe hardship in the event 
of a spouse’s hospitalization while across state lines.”42 Such 
“recognition bans inflict substantial and continuing harm.”43 The Court 
did not address which, if any, state interests would be sufficiently 
weighty to justify that substantial and continuing harm, instead merely 
noting that no interests had been articulated in the case at hand that 
would justify this particular ban.44 
 
 35. See OHIO CONST. ART. XV, § 11 (held unconstitutional by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015)) (“Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or 
recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall 
not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to 
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”). 
 36. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. 
 37. Id. at 2607 (“The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex 
couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”). 
 38. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 40. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607. 
 41. Id. (citing Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299 (1942)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 2608 (“[T]here is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-
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In the cases discussed above, the Court held that states may not 
prohibit marriage based on the races,45 poverty,46 or sexes of the 
parties.47 However, other marriage limitations remain, such as those 
based on the age of a contracting party,48 which means that certain 
marriages are still permitted in some jurisdictions but not in others. In 
such situations—where state laws differ about which marriages are 
permitted—some method is necessary to determine whether a 
particular marriage is valid. The Restatements (First and Second) of the 
Conflict of Laws offer guidelines to develop such a method, although 
the Restatement position is only persuasive49 unless it has been adopted 
by a State.50 
 
sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”). Suppose that 
a state refused to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere even though such marriages 
could be contracted within the state. Such a policy would be difficult to justify. For example, a 
state could not justify such a policy by claiming that it wanted its domiciliaries to spend their 
wedding dollars at home rather than in other states, because such a policy would violate dormant 
commerce clause guarantees. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid 
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007) (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 
624 (1978) (“Discriminatory laws motivated by ‘simple economic protectionism’ are subject to a 
‘virtually per se rule of invalidity.”)). 
 45. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 46. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978). 
 47. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 48. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-102 (B) (2018) (“Persons who are under sixteen 
years of age shall not marry.”); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13, § 123 (a) (West 2018) (“No individual 
under the age of 18 shall be granted a marriage license.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-5 (West) 
(allowing 17 year old individuals to marry if “each individual who is less than eighteen (18) years 
of age receives the consent required by IC 31-11-2,” and the individuals are not otherwise 
prohibited from marrying each other.); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-301(a) (West) (stating 
that individuals 16 or 17 years old may not marry unless the individual “has the consent of a parent 
or guardian and the parent or guardian swears that the individual is at least 16 years old,” or, 
absent consent, either party provides a certificate from a physician or nurse stating that “the 
woman is pregnant or has given birth to a child”); id. § 2-301(C) (“An individual under the age of 
15 may not marry.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.02 (West 2013); (“A person of the full age of 16 
years may, with the consent of the person’s legal custodial parents, guardian, or the court . . . 
receive a license to marry, when . . . the person’s application for a license and consent for civil 
marriage of a minor form is approved by the judge of the district court of the county in which the 
person resides.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:4 (2019) (“No person below the age of 16 years 
shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage, and all marriages contracted by such persons 
shall be null and void.”). 
 49. Cf. Myhre v. Hessey, 9 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Wis. 1943) (“In considering whether . . . [a 
particular position] should be adopted as the settled law of this state it should be noted that 
the Restatement of the Law, Torts, is apparently contrary to it.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Bryant v. Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Ariz. 1985) (“In determining 
which state’s law to apply, this Court has adopted the rules embodied in the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflicts (1971) to analyze and solve conflicts problems arising in Arizona.”). But see 
Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84, 85 (Ga. 2003) (“[T]he United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit . . . certified the following question of Georgia law to this Court: Whether 
a court applying Georgia conflicts of laws rules [must] follow the language of Restatement 
(Second) Conflict of Laws § 187(2) . . . . Because the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws has 
MARRIAGE, DOMICILE, AND THE CONSTITUTION FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  11:45 AM 
2020] MARRIAGE, DOMICILE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 113 
B. The Restatements 
Because the United States is such a mobile society,51 individuals 
who cannot marry in one state may go to another to marry. These 
individuals might then (1) return to live in their domicile with its 
stricter marriage laws, (2) remain in the state with the more forgiving 
marriage laws, or (3) move to some third state. 
The Restatements (First and Second) of the Conflict of Laws offer 
analyses of the conditions under which states should recognize 
marriages celebrated elsewhere, even if those marriages are subject to 
local prohibitions that do not violate constitutional guarantees.52 The 
Restatements balance a number of considerations, including each state’s 
interests in having its procedures followed and preventing its 
domiciliaries from contracting marriages which violate an important 
public policy of the state.53 While there are some differences between 
the two Restatements,54 both suggest that only the law of certain states 
will determine the validity of a marriage,55 and that marriages valid 
when celebrated should be recognized throughout the country. 
With certain important exceptions,56 the First Restatement suggests 
that marriages valid where celebrated should be recognized 
 
never been adopted in Georgia, and because we continue to refuse to enforce contractual rights 
which contravene the policy of Georgia, we answer in the negative.”).  
 51. Hilary K. Josephs, Book Review - Conflict of Laws: American, Comparative, 
International: Cases and Materials, 60 LA. L. REV. 1123, 1123–24 (2000) (“The United States is . . . 
a highly mobile society.”); Stephen Rauls, Family Law-Guardianship - the Uniform Adult 
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act: A Uniform Solution to an Arkansas 
Problem, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 75, 75 (2010) (“[T]the United States is a 
very mobile society.”). But see Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an 
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1716 (2012) (“[R]ecent studies 
have found that the United States is a far less mobile society than many European countries.”). 
 52. Both Restatements are discussed here because courts may “[c]hoose whether they will 
adopt a particular Restatement.” Peter A. Alces & Chris Byrne, Is It Time for the Restatement of 
Contracts, Fourth?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 195, 196 (2009). 
 53. Note that both the states of celebration and domicile have interests in having their laws 
followed. See infra notes 62–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatements’ positions on 
which state’s law governs marriage formalities and which state’s law governs the situations in 
which a marriage prohibited in the domicile may nonetheless be permitted in the state of 
celebration).  
 54. Compare FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 132 (c) (discussing the conditions under 
which interracial marriages need not be recognized), with SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5 
(omitting discussion because Loving had already been decided four years prior to the publication 
of the SECOND RESTATEMENT).  
 55. See infra notes 58–59 and 63–70 and accompanying text (suggesting that a marriage’s 
validity will be determined in light of the laws of the states of celebration and domicile at the time 
of the marriage’s celebration). 
 56. See infra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
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everywhere.57 In determining whether a marriage is valid, the law of the 
state of celebration will be used to assess: 
1. the necessity of a license; 
2. the necessity of a formal ceremony; 
3. the person to perform the ceremony; 
4. the manner of the performance of the ceremony; 
5. the capacity of the parties to enter into the contract of marriage; 
6. the necessity of physical examination before marriage.58 
Similarly favorable to the state of celebration, the First Restatement 
also explains the conditions under which common law marriages will 
be recognized: “A marriage without any formal ceremony is valid 
everywhere if the acts alleged to have created it took place in a state in 
which such a marriage is valid.”59 
The First Restatement specifies two exceptions to the rule that 
marriages valid where celebrated are valid everywhere. Section 131 
addresses cases where both parties to a divorce have been barred from 
remarrying,60 while Section 132 addresses certain specific marriages 
that are deemed void by the domicile of at least one of the parties.61 
Section 132 reads: 
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either 
party, though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration 
have been complied with, will be invalid everywhere in the following 
cases: 
(a) polygamous marriage, 
(b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that 
their marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil, 
 
 57. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 121 (“Except as stated in §§ 131 and 132, a 
marriage is valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law of the state where the 
contract of marriage takes place are complied with.”). 
 58. Id. § 121(e). 
 59. Id. § 123. 
 60. Id. § 131. For example, both parties might be prohibited from marrying third parties for 
some defined period. E.g., 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-23 (a) (West 2016) (“No judgment for 
a divorce shall become final and operative until three (3) months after the trial and decision.”). 
A state might do this in the hopes that the parties might reconcile. See Coe v. Coe, 303 S.E.2d 923, 
925 (Va. 1983) (“The statutorily mandated waiting period . . . between the time separation occurs 
and the time a final decree of divorce can be granted is designed primarily to give the parties an 
opportunity to reconcile and to determine if they desire the separation to be final.”). 
 61. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 132. 
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(c) marriage between persons of different races where such 
marriages are at the domicil regarded as odious,62 
(d) marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes 
void even though celebrated in another state.63 
In these cases, the Restatement privileges the law of the domicile at 
the time of celebration, at least where the marriage is thought to 
undermine a very important state interest (which is normally reflected 
by the state’s having made such marriages void).64 After Loving, states 
may not claim that interracial marriages violate an important public 
policy, but the rest of Section 132 remains persuasive authority.65 
The Second Restatement also privileges the law of the domicile at 
the time of the marriage’s celebration.66 According to this Restatement, 
like the First, a marriage contracted in accord with the law of the state 
of celebration will be valid in other states unless that marriage violates 
an important public policy of the domicile at the time of the marriage.67 
However, the Second Restatement includes some further details when 
deciding which state’s law to apply. For example, if the public policy at 
issue involves formality requirements such as a license or formal 
ceremony, the law of the state of celebration will apply unless the 
marriage’s invalidity “is required by the strong policy of another state 
which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the 
marriage at the time of the marriage,”68 i.e., the spouses’ domicile. With 
regards to common law marriage, the Second Restatement suggests that 
whether a common law marriage will be recognized is a decision 
involving the formality requirements of marriage,69 which means that 
the law of the state where the marriage is contracted will govern unless 
 
 62. This provision is no longer good law. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.  
 63. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 132. Some marriages are merely prohibited and 
are not treated as void—those marriages would be subject to recognition if validly celebrated 
elsewhere. E.g., Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934). 
 64. See Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and 
the Constitution, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 294–95 (1997) (noting that when states declare a 
marriage void, they indicate that the marriage violates an important public policy of the state). 
 65. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
 66. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 283 cmt. i (“Upholding the validity of 
marriage in such a case by application of the validating rule of the state of domicil would seem 
required . . . .”). 
 67. See id. § 283(2) (“A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the 
marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public 
policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage 
at the time of the marriage.”). 
 68. Id. § 283 cmt. f. 
 69. See id. § 283 cmt. g (“Whether a marriage can be created without formal ceremony is a 
question relating to formalities.”). 
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the recognition of such a marriage violates a strong policy of the 
parties’ domicile.70 
C. Evasion Statutes 
Evasion statutes are laws that are designed to prevent domiciliaries 
from avoiding (or evading) the marriage prohibitions contained in local 
law by crossing a border, marrying in accord with another state’s law, 
and then returning home claiming to have a valid marriage.71 The First 
Restatement discusses evasion statutes in Sections 121 and 134. Section 
121 discusses an evasion statute that a state of celebration might have: 
A statute in the state where the marriage is celebrated may provide 
that no marriage shall be contracted therein by one domiciled and 
intending to continue to be domiciled in another state if such 
marriage would be void if contracted in such other state and that 
every marriage celebrated in violation of such provision shall be null 
and void.72 
Section 132 discusses a statute that a state of domicile might have: 
A statute may provide in specific words or be so interpreted that if 
parties domiciled in a state and intending to continue to be 
domiciled there, who are disabled or prohibited from contracting 
marriage under the law of the state of the domicil, shall go into 
another state and there contract a marriage prohibited and declared 
void by the law of the domicil, such marriage shall be null and void 
for all purposes in the state of the domicil, with the same effect as 
though such prohibited marriage had been entered into in the state 
of the domicil. A marriage contracted under the circumstances 
referred to in such a statute will be void everywhere under the rule 
stated in this Section, clause (d).73 
Thus, the First Restatement recognizes that a domicile with an 
evasion statute may refuse to recognize any marriage that is treated as 
 
 70. See id. (“If the acts relied upon to create the marriage meet the requirements of the state 
where the acts took place, the marriage will not be held invalid for lack of the necessary 
formalities except in the unusual circumstances stated in Comment f.”). 
 71. See King v. Klemp, 57 A.2d 530, 536 (N.J. Ch. 1947) (“Such statutes generally declare 
that if either of the contracting parties residing and intending to continue to reside in the state, 
goes into another jurisdiction with intent to evade the marriage laws of the domiciliary state, 
such marriage is void.”); Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving 
Credit Where It’s Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313, 355 (1997) (“Not wanting their domiciliaries to be 
able to avoid their marriage laws by simply marrying in another state, states have passed evasion 
statutes.”). 
 72. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 121(g). 
 73. Id. § 132(e). 
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prohibited and void in the domicile,74 even if the marriage was validly 
celebrated elsewhere. Several illustrations are offered so that the 
meaning of this section is clear. In each of the illustrations, the law of 
the domicile at the time of the marriage’s celebration is considered.75 
That said, a state need not have an evasion statute to refuse to 
recognize a marriage celebrated elsewhere.76 Thus, a marriage void in 
the domicile does not to be recognized even though (1) the marriage 
was celebrated elsewhere in accord with local law, and (2) the domicile 
does not have an evasion statute specifically precluding that marriage.77 
However, merely because a marriage is treated as void under local law 
does not establish that such a marriage will not be recognized if validly 
celebrated elsewhere—many states have general policies of 
recognizing marriages that are valid where celebrated, even if the 
marriage is void in the domicile.78 
Sometimes, a state’s evasion statute in effect announces that 
marriages violating an important public policy of the state will not be 
recognized even if those marriages are validly celebrated elsewhere.79 
 
 74. A state might disallow a marriage by either prohibiting it or by making it voidable or 
void. As a general matter, a prohibited or voidable marriage is considered less offensive to public 
policy than a void marriage. See Strasser, supra note 71, at 353 (“Just as voidable marriages are 
not viewed as particularly odious and thus not the kind of marriages which the state should refuse 
to recognize if validly celebrated elsewhere, so too prohibited (but not void) marriages are 
viewed as less odious to public policy than void marriages.”). 
 75. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, illus. 1-3. See also id. § 134 cmt. a (“Wherever a 
particularly strong policy of the state of the domicil at the time of the marriage is concerned, the 
validity of the marriage may be involved under the rule stated in § 131 and 132.”). 
 76. Strasser, supra note 71, at 355 (“[T]hese statutes were unnecessary insofar as they were 
designed to justify the refusal to recognize a marriage void in the domicile but legally celebrated 
elsewhere.”). 
 77. See First Nat. Bank in Grand Forks v. N. Dakota Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 68 N.W.2d 
661, 663 (N.D. 1955) (citing McDonald v. McDonald, 58 P.2d 163 (Cal. 1936)) (“A state has the 
prerogative to regulate by legislation the marital status of its own citizens domiciled therein to the 
extent of prohibiting certain marriages upon the ground of public policy and may give effect to 
such prohibition in nullifying a marriage performed in violation thereof though solemnized in 
another state.”). 
 78. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 2017) (“A marriage contracted outside this state 
that would be valid by laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted is valid in 
California.”); Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing a first cousin 
marriage celebrated in Tennessee by an Indiana domiciliary, notwithstanding that such a marriage 
was void in the domicile); Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1958) (recognizing 
validity of a first-cousin marriage validly celebrated elsewhere even though such a marriage would 
be void if celebrated in Ohio). 
 79. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/216 (2004) (“[I]f any person residing and intending 
to continue to reside in this state and who is a person with a disability or prohibited from 
contracting marriage under the laws of this state, shall go into another state or country and there 
contract a marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws of this state, such marriage shall be 
null and void for all purposes in this state with the same effect as though such prohibited marriage 
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When there is such a statute, a court would be less likely to interpret 
state policy as favoring the recognition of a marriage valid where 
celebrated even though void in the domicile, precisely because the 
legislature had expressly stated that such marriages should not be 
recognized.80 
A state need not reserve its evasion statute for those marriages that 
are void in the domicile.81 Instead, a state might refuse to recognize any 
marriage celebrated elsewhere by its domiciliaries if that marriage is 
prohibited locally.82 In effect, adopting an evasion statute voiding any 
marriage that cannot be celebrated within the state suggests that 
domiciliaries of that state who attempt to evade local marriage law by 
going elsewhere to marry have thereby violated an important public 
policy of their state. Such a state implicitly considers the evasion itself 
as violating an important public policy, which the state presumably 
views as adequate justification to refuse to recognize the marriage even 
if the marriage itself does not violate an important public policy.83 
D. Marital Status Recognition Caselaw 
Both Restatements suggest that a marriage valid in the domicile at 
the time of the marriage must be recognized in subsequently acquired 
domiciles. However, a Restatement position does not bind a particular 
state unless the state has adopted that position.84 Further, a legislature 
 
had been entered into in this state.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d at 360 (citing State v. Yoder, 130 N.W. 10 (Minn. 1911) 
(“A marriage contract is a nullity ab initio only where expressly so declared by statute. In such a 
case, it is absolutely void, requiring no judicial decree for its dissolution.”)). See also Strasser, 
supra note 71, at 355 (“When an evasion statute has been passed, courts are less able to argue that 
the legislature’s intent is unclear and that therefore the marriage legally celebrated elsewhere 
should be recognized by the domicile. The statute specifies which marriages, legally celebrated 
elsewhere, should nonetheless not be recognized in the domicile.”). 
 81. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.04(1) (West 1979) (“If any person residing and intending 
to continue to reside in this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under 
the laws of this state goes into another state or country and there contracts a marriage prohibited 
or declared void under the laws of this state, such marriage shall be void for all purposes in this 
state with the same effect as though it had been entered into in this state.”). 
 82. See In re Estate of Toutant, 633 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (invalidating the 
marriage of Wisconsin domiciliaries that had been celebrated within six months of the divorce of 
one of parties, in violation of WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.04, notwithstanding that the state of 
celebration, Texas, did not have a similar bar).  
 83. Cf. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 283(2) (“A marriage which satisfies the 
requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as 
valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant 
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.”). 
 84. Michael Baram et al., Regulatory and Liability Considerations, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
5, 60 (2000) (statement of Gary Marchant) (“Each state has to independently adopt the 
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or state supreme court could always decide to reject a position that had 
previously been adopted.85 For example, a state that had been willing 
to recognize any marriage valid in the domicile at the time of 
celebration might subsequently adopt a different position because of 
changes in public policy or later developments in that state’s law.86 This 
ability of states to depart from the Restatements’ recommendations 
illustrates the importance of establishing—as a constitutional matter—
which marriages must be recognized. Those seeking to understand 
which marriages are constitutionally protected should consider the 
Court’s divorce jurisprudence, where the Court has discussed the 
conditions under which a marital status determination from one state 
must be given credit in other states. 
The Court has long recognized that states have an important 
interest in regulating marriage and divorce. For example, it has noted 
that the legislature “prescribes the age at which parties may contract to 
marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the 
duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of 
both . . . and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.”87 
But the Court’s acknowledgement that states have an important 
interest in marriage and divorce does not help determine which state’s 
law controls where marriages permitted in one jurisdiction are 
prohibited in another. 
The Court has suggested that the domicile has an especially 
important interest in the marital status of its domiciliaries, as Haddock 
v. Haddock88 illustrates. At issue in Haddock was the marital status of 
John and Harriet Haddock.89 The couple wed in New York,90 although 
 
new Restatement before it becomes binding in that state.”). See also Hedrick v. Rains, 477 S.E.2d 
171, 172 (N.C. 1996) (“Except as specifically adopted in this jurisdiction, the Restatement should 
not be viewed as determinative of North Carolina law.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Paige v. City of Sterling Heights, 720 N.W.2d 219, 235 (Mich. 2006) (“[T]his 
Court has the authority to overrule one of its prior decisions.”). 
 86. See Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Mo. 1985) (Blackmar, J., concurring in the result) 
(citing Keener v. Dayton Elec. Manufacturing Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969)) (“Our Court has 
been very willing to consider modern developments in the law of torts and to overrule or 
distinguish earlier cases which seemed to stand in the way.”). 
 87. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). 
 88. 201 U.S. 562 (1906), overruled in part by Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
 89. Id. at 564–65 (“The wife, a resident of the state of New York, sued the husband in that 
state in 1899, and there obtained personal service upon him . . . . [T]he answer alleged that the 
husband had, in 1881, obtained in a court of the State of Connecticut a divorce which was 
conclusive.”).  
 90. Id. at 606 (Brown, J., dissenting).  
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John claimed that Harriet had fraudulently induced him to marry her.91 
In any event, they separated shortly after the wedding without 
consummating the marriage and never lived together thereafter.92 John 
established domicile in Connecticut93 while Harriet remained 
domiciled in New York.94 After constructively serving Harriet with 
notice,95 John secured a divorce from her in Connecticut,96 even though 
she never appeared at the Connecticut proceeding.97 Harriet later sued 
John for divorce in New York.98 
The Haddock Court reasoned that because John had been 
domiciled in Connecticut when securing his divorce from Harriet, his 
marital status (no longer being married to Harriet) could not be 
challenged in Connecticut. The Court wrote: “[W]here a court of one 
State, conformably to the laws of such State . . . has acted concerning 
the dissolution of the marriage tie, as to a citizen of that State, such 
action is binding in that State as to such citizen[.]”99 At this time,100 the 
domicile’s power over the marital status of its citizens was viewed as so 
great that the state’s determination of its domiciliary’s marital status 
was immune from a federal due process challenge.101  
Connecticut’s power to change the marital status of one of its own 
domiciliaries,102 however, did not extend to changing the marital status 
of a non-domiciliary lacking ties to the state.103 Thus, while Connecticut 
 
 91. Id. at 564–65. 
 92. Id. at 606. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 564. 
 95. Id. at 566. 
 96. Id. at 606. 
 97. Id. at 565. 
 98. Id. at 564. 
 99. Id. at 569 (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888)). 
 100. Note that this view has not withstood the test of time, and complainants can now bring 
federal due process challenges to a state’s marriage restriction. See Williams v. North Carolina, 
317 U.S. 287, 306 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“If the actions of the Nevada court had 
been taken ‘without due process of law,’ the divorces which it purported to decree would have 
been without legal sanction in every state including Nevada.”).  
 101. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 569 (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)) (“[T]he validity 
of the judgment may not therein be questioned on the ground that the action of the State in 
dealing with its own citizen concerning the marriage relation was repugnant to the due process 
clause of the Constitution.”).  
 102. See id. at 572 (“[N]o question can arise . . . concerning the right of the State of 
Connecticut . . . to give effect to the decree of divorce rendered in favor of the husband . . . 
domiciled in that state . . . .”). 
 103. See id. (“[T]the Connecticut court did not acquire jurisdiction over the wife . . . by virtue 
of the domicil of the wife within the State or as the result of personal service upon her within its 
borders.”). 
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had the power to change John’s marital status, it did not have the power 
to change the marital status of Harriet, who was a New York 
domiciliary.104 John’s Connecticut divorce decree did not trigger full 
faith and credit guarantees,105 and New York was free to grant Harriet 
spousal support and a separation from bed and board.106 In other words, 
New York was free to refuse to recognize that Connecticut had legally 
ended the Haddocks’ marriage.107 
Haddock represents great deference to the domicile’s power to 
determine marital status, in that each domicile in certain circumstances 
is permitted to make its own determination regarding its domiciliary’s 
marital status. But this policy of deference to the domicile leads to 
anomalous results where two married individuals are domiciled in 
different states. 
In Atherton v. Atherton, another marriage recognition case decided 
shortly before Haddock, the Court suggested that the law would never 
recognize a spouseless spouse: 
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of 
matrimony, by a court of competent jurisdiction, are to change the 
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free 
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to 
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife 
without a husband, is unknown to the law.108 
Although seemingly contradictory, Atherton and Haddock are 
distinguishable. In Atherton, the divorce was granted in the state of 
 
 104. Cf. id. at 574 (“If the fact be that where persons are married in the State of New York 
either of the parties to the marriage may, in violation of the marital obligations, desert the other 
and go into the State of Connecticut, there acquiring a domicil, and procure a dissolution of the 
marriage which would be binding in the State of New York as to the party to the marriage there 
domiciled, it would follow that the power of the State of New York as to the dissolution of the 
marriage as to its domiciled citizen would be of no practical avail.”). 
 105. Id. at 606 (“[T]he decree of the court of Connecticut rendered under the circumstances 
stated was not entitled to obligatory enforcement in the State of New York by virtue of the full 
faith and credit clause.”). See also Sheila Jordan Cunningham, Jurisdiction in the Ex Parte 
Divorce: Do Absent Spouses Have A Protected Due Process Interest in Their Marital Status?, 13 
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 205, 222 (1983) (“In upholding the denial of recognition to the Connecticut 
decree, the Supreme Court did not emphasize the rights of the absent spouse whose marital status 
was determined without her presence, but rather, emphasized the rights of the absent spouse’s 
domiciliary state.”). 
 106. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 565.  
 107. See id. at 581 (suggesting that the Connecticut decree could but did not have to be 
recognized by New York as a matter of comity). 
 108. 181 U.S. 155, 162 (1901). 
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marital domicile,109 whereas in Haddock it was not.110 According to the 
Haddock Court, an ex parte divorce in the marital domicile is subject 
to full faith and credit guarantees,111 whereas a divorce in a nonmarital 
domicile lacking personal jurisdiction over the nondomiciliary spouse 
is not.112 
The Haddock approach is not without difficulty. Suppose, for 
example, that John Haddock had remarried in Connecticut following 
his Connecticut divorce, and then had moved with his new wife, Helen, 
and their children to New York. Suppose further that John died and 
both Harriet and Helen sought to administer the estate. New York 
could decide that Harriet was still married to John, which would have 
negated Helen’s marriage (and family) in the eyes of the law.113 As 
Justice Holmes observed in his Haddock dissent, “[T]he decision . . . is 
likely to cause considerable disaster to innocent persons and to 
bastardize children hitherto supposed to be the offspring of lawful 
marriage[.]”114 
The Court overruled Haddock in Williams v. North Carolina,115 
illustrating that the interests of subsequent domiciles in enforcing their 
marriage laws must give way to other interests.116 At issue in Williams 
was whether North Carolina had to recognize divorce decrees issued in 
 
 109. Id. at 157. The place of marital domicile is the state where the married couple lives, with 
the intention to remain there indefinitely. See In re Smidt’s Will, 295 N.Y.S. 227, 230 (Sur. 1937) 
(citing In re Newcomb’s Estate, 84 N.E. 950, 954 (N.Y. 1908)). 
 110. Haddock, 201 U.S. 577 (“As the husband, after wrongfully abandoning the wife in New 
York, never established a matrimonial domicil in Connecticut, it cannot be said that he took with 
him the marital relation from which he fled to Connecticut.”). 
 111. Id. at 572. 
 112. Id. (“[I]t is apparent that the Connecticut court did not acquire jurisdiction over the 
wife . . . by virtue of the domicil of the wife within the State or as the result of personal service 
upon her within its borders.”). See also id. at 606 (“[T]he decree of the court of Connecticut 
rendered under the circumstances stated was not entitled to obligatory enforcement in the State 
of New York by virtue of the full faith and credit clause.”). 
 113. Cf. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903), abrogated by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 
343 (1948). In Andrews, Charles’s first wife, Kate, and his second wife, Annie, each sought to be 
declared his lawful widow. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the United 
States Supreme Court, held that Charles’s divorce was void, which made his second marriage void 
and which made Kate his lawful widow. See id. at 42 (“[W]e conclude that no violation of the due 
faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States arose from the action of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in obeying the command of the state statute, and 
refusing to give effect to the decree of divorce in question.”). 
 114. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 115. 317 U.S. 287, 304 (1942). 
 116. See id. at 303–04 (“[T]he considerable interests involved, and the substantial and far-
reaching effects which the allowance of an exception would have on innocent persons, indicate 
that the purpose of the full faith and credit clause and of the supporting legislation would be 
thwarted to a substantial degree if the rule of Haddock v. Haddock were perpetuated.”). 
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Nevada to individuals domiciled in North Carolina at the time the 
divorce decrees were contested.117 The Court held that the decrees were 
subject to full faith and credit,118 assuming that the Nevada court had 
jurisdiction to grant the divorces.119 In so holding, the Williams Court 
relied on the importance of domicile, explaining that “the power of a 
state to alter the marital status of its domiciliaries . . . is dependent on 
the relationship which domicil creates and the pervasive control which 
a state has over marriage and divorce within its own borders.”120 But 
the Court also held that once a court has granted a divorce to the party 
domiciled there (assuming that the other party has been afforded 
proper notice),121 that divorce decree triggers full faith and credit 
guarantees, regardless of whether either party subsequently changes 
domicile: 
[W]hen a court of one state acting in accord with the requirements 
of procedural due process alters the marital status of one domiciled 
in that state by granting him a divorce from his absent spouse, we 
cannot say its decree should be excepted from the full faith and 
credit clause merely because its enforcement or recognition in 
another state would conflict with the policy of the latter.122  
Suppose that Margaret and Michael Salmon marry in New York 
post-Williams. Michael abandons Margaret immediately after the 
wedding and becomes a Connecticut domiciliary. A year and a half 
later,123 he obtains a divorce after affording Margaret the requisite 
notice. Under Williams, that divorce triggers full faith and credit 
guarantees,124 and New York will be forced to recognize the divorce. 
 
 117. Id. at 290.  
 118. Id. at 303. 
 119. Id. at 302 (“[I]n this case we must assume that petitioners had a bona fide domicil in 
Nevada, not that the Nevada domicil was a sham.”).  
 120. Id. at 300. 
 121. See id. at 298–99 (citing Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 172 (1901)) (“[E]ach state 
by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of marriage 
can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there, even though 
the other spouse is absent . . . [as long as the notice afforded] meet[s] the requirements 
of due process.”). 
 122. Id. at 303. 
 123. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-44(c)(1) (West 2018) (“A decree dissolving a 
marriage or granting a legal separation may be entered if: (1) One of the parties to the marriage 
has been a resident of this state for at least the twelve months next preceding the date of the filing 
of the complaint or next preceding the date of the decree.”). 
 124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (noting that once a court has granted a divorce 
to a party domiciled in a certain state, that divorce decree triggers full faith and credit guarantees, 
regardless of whether either of the formerly married parties subsequently changes domicile). 
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Williams limits the power of New York (Margaret’s domicile in the 
hypothesized example) to determine its domiciliary’s marital status. 
The Williams Court understood the implications of its decision, 
recognizing that the first domicile’s powers to determine the marital 
status of its own domiciliaries and enforce its own divorce laws would 
be undermined if the state were forced to give full faith and credit to a 
subsequent domicile’s decree.125 However, the Court reasoned that an 
analogous objection “goes to the application of the full faith and credit 
clause to many situations.”126 In other words, states occasionally having 
their policies undermined to some degree is an inherent effect of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause. While this reality means that “one state’s 
policy of strict control over the institution of marriage could be 
thwarted by the decree of a more lax state,”127 the Court explained, 
“[s]uch is part of the price of our federal system.”128 
In Estin v. Estin,129 the Court detailed some of the reasons why 
domiciles have an important interest in the marital status of their 
domiciliaries: 
Marital status involves the regularity and integrity of the marriage 
relation. It affects the legitimacy of the offspring of marriage . . . . 
The State has a considerable interest . . . in protecting the offspring 
of marriages from being bastardized . . . . The State should have the 
power to guard its interest in [its domiciliaries] by changing or 
altering their marital status and by protecting them in that 
changed status throughout the farthest reaches of the nation.130 
In Estin, the Court decided that an order of spousal support issued 
during a separation proceeding was enforceable even after a divorce 
decree had been granted by another state,131 and the Court’s insights 
are relevant in other contexts as well. If a marriage might subsequently 
be invalidated in a different domicile, property interests and the 
legitimacy of children would be at risk.132 
 
 125. Williams, 317 U.S. at 302 (“It is objected, however, that if such divorce decrees must be 
given full faith and credit, a substantial dilution of the sovereignty of other states will be 
effected.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 334 U.S. 541 (1948). 
 130. Id. at 546 (emphasis added). 
 131. Id. at 542 (“This case . . . presents an important question . . . whether a New York decree 
awarding respondent $180 per month for her maintenance and support in a separation proceeding 
survived a Nevada divorce decree which subsequently was granted petitioner.”). 
 132. When discussing marriage annulments, both Restatements refer to the law of the 
domicile at the time of the marriage’s celebration. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5,           
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E. Limiting Enjoyment of the Incidents of Marriage 
Even if a marriage is considered “valid” throughout the nation, a 
state might still choose to deny certain couples some of the incidents or 
benefits of that marriage. For example, the state might refuse to accord 
to certain spouses a special status in tort or in medical decision-
making.133 Because this ability might permit states to undermine the 
requirement that they recognize marriages validly celebrated 
elsewhere, the power to deny the incidents of marriage must also be 
addressed here. 
The Restatements’ policies regarding the recognition of marital 
status and the enjoyment of marital incidents strike a compromise by 
precluding states from refusing to recognize the couple’s marital status, 
while allowing states to deny the enjoyment of some of the incidents of 
marriage.134 The Constitution imposes some limits on the power of 
states to deny marital couples the enjoyment of these incidents,135 
although the contours of those limitations have not been fully 
developed. 
The First Restatement suggests that while a marriage valid in the 
states of celebration and domicile at the time of the marriage is valid in 
all states,136 states may prohibit married couples from enjoying all the 
incidents of marriage if their union violates an important public policy 
of the state.137 For example, suppose that the state of celebration and 
 
§ 286 (“The law governing the right to a decree of nullity is the law which determines the validity 
of the marriage.”); id. § 286 cmt. a (“For the law which determines the validity of a marriage, see 
§ 283.”); id. § 283(2) (“A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the 
marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public 
policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage 
at the time of the marriage.”); FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 136 (“The law governing the 
right to a decree of nullity is the law which determined the validity of the marriage with respect 
to the matter on account of which the marriage is alleged to be null.”); id. § 132 (listing multiple 
situations in which marriages against the law of the state of domicil of either party will be invalid, 
even though the might comply with the law of the state of celebration). 
 133. Cf. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (Vt. 1999) (discussing “a broad array of legal 
benefits and protections incident to the marital relation, including access to a spouse’s medical, 
life, and disability insurance, hospital visitation and other medical decisionmaking privileges, 
spousal support, intestate succession, homestead protections, and many other statutory 
protections”). 
 134. See infra notes 137–159 and accompanying text. 
 135. See infra notes 144–159 and accompanying text. 
 136. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 121 (stating that “a marriage is valid 
everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law of the state where the contract of marriage 
takes place are complied with”); id. § 132 (suggesting that the marriage will be valid as long as it 
does not violate a very important public policy of the domicile at the time of the marriage). 
 137. See id. § 134 (“If any effect of a marriage created by the law of one state is deemed by 
the courts of another state sufficiently offensive to the policy of the latter state, the latter state 
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domicile recognizes polygamous unions. A man marries two women in 
accord with the law of the domicile, and then moves to a state that does 
not recognize polygamous unions. Under the First Restatement’s 
approach, the latter state must recognize the marriage, but may refuse 
to permit them all to live together.138 According to the First 
Restatement, such a refusal does not constitute a rejection of the 
marriage’s validity,139 although it would of course have important 
implications for the family’s living arrangements. The Second 
Restatement incorporates a similar approach.140 
In Pavan v. Smith, the Court addressed whether Arkansas could 
deny an incident of marriage to a same-sex couple: namely, having both 
parents’ names on the birth certificate of a child born into the 
marriage.141 The Court struck down Arkansas’s law “[b]ecause that 
differential treatment infringes Obergefell’s commitment to provide 
same-sex couples ‘the constellation of benefits that the States have 
linked to marriage.’”142 By the same token, the Court would likely 
strike down a state attempt to prevent a married same-sex couple from 
living together. Indeed, Lawrence v. Texas precludes states from 
prohibiting even non-marital same-sex couples from living together.143 
It remains to be seen, however, whether Lawrence and Pavan would 
preclude states from ever denying the enjoyment of any incidents of 
marriage. For example, Lawrence expressly restricts its holding to 
 
will refuse to give that effect to the marriage.”). See also Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right 
to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1473 (2012) (“Under traditional 
conflicts doctrine, while the place of celebration rule governed the validity of the marriage, courts 
were allowed to look to local law to determine whether a married party should be entitled under 
local law to enjoy a particular marital incident.”). 
 138. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 134 illus. 1 (“A, domiciled in state X, validly 
marries B and C in X. By the law of Y, a polygamous marriage is void. A brings B and C to state 
Y; Y may refuse to permit him to cohabit with them. A and B die; Y may grant a widow’s 
allowance to C.”). 
 139. Id. § 134 cmt. a (“The action of the state in refusing to give effect to a marriage on the 
ground stated in this Section does not deny the validity of the marriage, but precludes the 
enjoyment within the state of some particular right or other interest incident to the marriage.”). 
 140. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 284 cmt. c (“A state will not give a particular 
incident to a foreign marriage when to do so would be contrary to its strong local policy. The state 
will not do so even though the marriage is valid in the state where it was contracted and even 
though the incident in question would be granted in that state. A denial of a particular incident 
on the grounds stated in this Comment does not deny the validity of the marriage.”). 
 141. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017). 
 142. Id. (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015)). 
 143. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“When sexuality finds overt expression 
in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond 
that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
right to make this choice.”).  
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adults,144 and thus does not preclude states from preventing an adult 
from living with a minor whom he had married.145 Pavan’s reach might 
also be limited in that Arkansas was trying to do something that even 
the Restatement did not authorize.146 
At issue in Pavan was an Arkansas provision denying the 
enjoyment of an incident of marriage to couples who were permitted to 
marry within the state.147 By contrast, the Restatement sections 
permitting the denial of enjoyment of the incidents of marriage involve 
marriages that were valid in the domicile when celebrated, but which 
could not have been celebrated within the forum, e.g., the state where 
the couple moved several years into their marriage.148 Pavan might thus 
be interpreted in two different ways. The narrower interpretation is that 
states may only deny the incidents of marriage to marriages that could 
not be celebrated within the state. The broader interpretation is that 
states may not deny the incidents of marriage to any valid marriage, 
even if those marriages could not have been celebrated within that 
state. 
Citing Obergefell, the Pavan Court suggested that Arkansas was 
engaging in “disparate treatment” of same-sex couples.149 If the Court 
was thereby implying that the State did not have legitimate reasons to 
support its differential treatment,150 then the Court may be leaving 
open whether states are permitted to deny the incidents of marriage to 
couples where doing so would not be demeaning or discriminatory151 
but would instead promote legitimate state interests. 
 
 144. Id. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors.”).  
 145. See id. (noting that the present case also “does not involve persons who might be injured 
or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused”). 
 146. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 147. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2075. Here, the incident being denied was a birth certificate bearing 
both parents’ names—in this case, two mothers. Id. at 2077. 
 148. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 134 cmt. b (noting that “the foreign marriage 
would have been contrary to the statute of the forum had it occurred within the state”); see also 
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 284 cmt. b (noting that “the marriage would have been 
invalid in the state if it had been contracted there”). 
 149. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015)). 
 150. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“Especially against a long history of disapproval of 
their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and 
continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and 
subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this 
unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry.”). 
 151. Cf. id. at 2602 (“It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central 
institution of the Nation’s society.”).  
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The Obergefell Court stated that the Constitution “does not permit 
the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as 
accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”152 That Court may have been 
thinking either that the Constitution requires states to treat all 
marriages similarly or that the Constitution permits states to make 
distinctions among couples with respect to the enjoyment of the 
incidents of marriage as long as those distinctions are reasonable.153 For 
example, states might be able to deny the enjoyment of some of the 
incidents of marriage to some of those couples who could not have 
contracted the marriage within the state, i.e., those marriages that are 
very offensive to local policy.154 Clarification of the constitutional 
limitations on the power of states to restrict the enjoyment of the 
incidents of marriage will have to await resolution in future cases. 
F. Right to Travel 
An additional constitutional consideration supports the contention 
that a marriage valid in the domicile at the time of the marriage’s 
celebration must be recognized throughout the nation. The Court has 
recognized that a United States citizen’s “‘constitutional right to travel 
from one State to another’ is firmly embedded in our 
jurisprudence.”155 Individuals who have a valid marriage according to 
their domicile’s law cannot be precluded from visiting other states.156 
Indeed, the Obergefell Court noted that permitting one state to refuse 
to recognize a marriage validly recognized in a sister domicile might 
severely burden individual travel rights: “[E]ven an ordinary drive into 
 
 152. Id. at 2607. 
 153. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that 
every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of . . . marriage must be subjected 
to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere 
with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.”). 
 154. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 134 cmt. b (“The mere fact that the foreign 
marriage would have been contrary to the statute of the forum had it occurred within the state, 
does not make it so offensive to local policy as to be refused enforcement.”); see also SECOND 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 284 cmt. b (“A state will give the same incidents to a marriage, 
which is valid under the principles stated in § 283, that it gives to a marriage validly contracted 
within its own territory, except as stated in Comment c. This is true even though the marriage 
would have been invalid in the state if it had been contracted there. So a state will usually permit 
the parties to a valid foreign marriage to cohabit within its territory even though the marriage 
would have been invalid . . . .”). 
 155. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 
(1966)). 
 156. Id. at 500 (“The ‘right to travel’ discussed in our cases . . . protects the right of a citizen 
of one State to enter and to leave another State, [and] the right to be treated as a welcome visitor 
rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State.”). 
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a neighboring State to visit family or friends risks causing severe 
hardship in the event of a spouse’s hospitalization while across state 
lines.”157 
The difficulty posed by a state’s refusal to recognize a marriage of 
a visiting couple is avoided if only domiciles are permitted to refuse to 
recognize marriages that had been valid at the time of celebration. 
Suppose, for example, that a couple is domiciled in State D, celebrates 
a marriage in State C, and visits friends in State V. Assume further that 
the marriage is valid in states D and C. State V would be required to 
recognize the marriage, even if the marriage violated an important 
policy of that state. But if the couple decided to stay and make State V 
their new domicile, the limitation on non-domiciles would not prevent 
State V (their new domicile) from refusing to recognize their 
marriage.158 Here, it is critical to note that the right to travel not only 
protects the right of United States citizens to visit other states, but also 
protects, “for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, 
the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.”159 
Both the Restatements and the Constitution would thus preclude a 
subsequent domicile from refusing to recognize a marriage valid in the 
state of domicile at the time of the marriage’s celebration. As the Court 
has explained, “[s]tates . . . do not have any right to select their 
citizens.”160 Further, a state may not discourage individuals from 
coming to that state merely because the state views those individuals 
as undesirable. For example, a state is precluded from trying to deter 
indigents from moving to that state,161 notwithstanding the state’s valid 
interest in protecting the public fisc.162 So, too, a state is not permitted 
to refuse to recognize marriages validly celebrated in other domiciles 
as a way to deter those married couples from moving to the state. The 
Restatements’ position reflects a similar approach—a subsequent 
 
 157. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (citing Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299 
(1942)). 
 158. Cf. Ex parte Kinney, 14 F. Cas. 602, 606 (C.C.E.D Va. 1879) (“That such a citizen [who 
had entered into an interracial marriage in another domicile] would have a right of transit with 
his wife through Virginia, and of temporary stoppage, and of carrying on any business here not 
requiring residence [notwithstanding Virginia’s treating such marriages as void], may be 
conceded, because those are privileges following a citizen of the United States.”). 
 159. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500. 
 160. Id. at 511. 
 161. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (“[T]he purpose of deterring the in-
migration of indigents cannot serve as justification for the classification created by the one-year 
waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible.”). 
 162. Id. at 633 (“We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity 
of its programs.”).  
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domicile may not deny the validity of a marriage valid in the couple’s 
former domicile at the time of celebration, because a marriage valid in 
the state of domicile at the time of celebration is valid throughout the 
country.163 A marriage valid throughout the country would be valid in 
the subsequently acquired domicile as well. 
This result might seem counter-intuitive because such an approach 
favors the couple who subsequently acquires a domicile over the couple 
who had always lived there. Consider a couple, Riley Rivers and Reese 
Rogers, precluded by Domicile1’s law from marrying. This couple has 
always lived in that state. Even were they to visit another state and 
marry in accord with local law, Domicile1 would not have to recognize 
that marriage if that union violated an important public policy of the 
state.164 Next consider Sandy Smith and Sasha Stockton, who live in 
Domicile2 and marry in accord with local law. If Sandy and Sasha had 
lived in Domicile1, they could not have married for the same reason 
that Riley and Reese are precluded from marrying. 
Suppose that a few years into their marriage Sandy and Sasha 
receive very attractive job offers from an employer based in Domicile1. 
Were Sandy and Sasha to accept those offers and move to Domicile1, 
their marriage would have to be recognized because it had been valid 
in the state of celebration and domicile at the time of its celebration. 
Nonetheless, Riley and Reese would still be precluded from marrying 
in Domicile1. Further, even if they temporarily visited Sandy and 
Sasha’s former home (Domicile2) and celebrated their wedding there, 
Domicile1 could legally refuse to recognize that marriage. It might seem 
that Sandy and Sasha, who subsequently moved to Domicile1, are being 
accorded better treatment than Riley and Reese, who had always lived 
there. 
As unfair as this outcome may seem, Riley and Reese are unlike 
Sandy and Sasha in an important respect: the former couple never had 
a valid marriage in their domicile, while the latter couple did. Sandy 
and Sasha cannot constitutionally be forced to forego their valid 
marriage as a price of traveling or moving to Domicile1, whereas Riley 
and Reese would never have had a valid marriage. 
 
 163. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 104 P.3d 857, 865–66 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“When the parties 
moved from Virginia to Arizona in 1989, their marriage was valid under the laws of the state of 
Arizona, not simply under Virginia law.” (emphasis in original)). Note, however, that a state 
might be able to deny the couple the enjoyment of some of the incidents of marriage. See supra 
note 134 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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The couple marrying in accord with the laws of the states of 
celebration and domicile at the time of the marriage would have 
justifiable and reasonable beliefs about the validity of their 
marriage, whereas the couple evading their domicile’s law would be 
on notice that their domicile at the time of the marriage might not 
recognize the union even if it was validly celebrated elsewhere.165 
Thus, there is an important sense in which Sandy and Sasha are not 
comparable to Riley and Reese. Sandy and Sasha might well have made 
a variety of decisions reasonably and justifiably relying on the validity 
of their marriage. They would be more comparable to Charlie and 
Casey, who had married at home in Domicile1 in accord with the law of 
the state of celebration and domicile (i.e., Domicile1). Refusing to 
recognize the marriage of Sandy and Sasha, who had married in accord 
with the law of the state of celebration and domicile at the time of the 
wedding (Domicile2) while recognizing the marriage of Charlie and 
Casey would involve treating the citizens of another state (Domicile2) 
less favorably than the citizens of Domicile1. Disfavoring couples with 
valid marriages from other states implicates right to travel 
guarantees.166 
The right to travel precludes a state, absent some extremely 
important justification, from imposing a severe burden on United 
States citizens who wish to emigrate to that state.167 The Court has not 
made clear which state interests, if any, would be sufficiently important 
to justify refusing a couple the enjoyment of the incidents of marriage 
if that couple’s marriage was valid in the couple’s domicile at the time 
of celebration. Perhaps polygamous unions would present sufficiently 
important interests to deny the enjoyment of the incidents of 
marriage.168 Perhaps not. 
 
 165. Mark Strasser, The Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Sex Couples, and 
the Right to Travel, 52 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 553, 575 (2000). 
 166. Cf. Strasser, supra note 64, at 307 (“[A] law which would void one’s marriage validly 
celebrated in another state would be a serious deterrent to travel, given that marriage involves 
such a fundamental interest.”). 
 167. Cf. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) (“[B]ecause this classification 
impinged on the constitutionally guaranteed right of interstate travel, it was to be judged by the 
standard of whether it promoted a compelling state interest.”). 
 168. Cf. supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that some state interests 
might be sufficiently important to allow a state to deny the incidents of a marriage). 
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II. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SELECTED STATE 
RECOGNITION PRACTICES  
 Both Restatements suggest that a marriage valid in the domicile at 
the time of the marriage is valid throughout the country. The Court has 
emphasized the interests of the domicile in assuring that its marital 
status determinations are respected throughout the nation. In the 
divorce context, the Court has made clear that the interest of 
subsequent domiciles in determining marital status must give way to 
considerations such as the individual interests implicated in marriage 
and the state interests in being part of a federal system. Further, the 
fundamental interest in marriage is abridged when individuals are 
forced to surrender their marriages as a price of entering a state. 
Additionally, right to travel guarantees limit the power of subsequent 
domiciles to deny a marriage’s validity and, perhaps, the enjoyment of 
certain incidents of marriage. Were the Court to expressly embrace 
these constitutional limitations, some state recognition practices with 
respect to common law marriage and to marriages involving individuals 
closely related by consanguinity or affinity might need to be modified. 
A. Common Law Marriage 
Several states still recognize common law marriage,169 while other 
states not only prohibit such marriages but also treat them as void.170 
Given this divergence of practice and the degree to which certain states 
believe common law marriage to be contrary to public policy,171 it 
would be helpful to know the conditions under which states must 
recognize such marriages if contracted elsewhere, even assuming that 
states may constitutionally prohibit their being contracted locally. 
When permitted, a common law marriage may be contracted where 
two parties agree to be married, hold themselves out to the community 
 
 169. Bryan E. Gates, Filing Status, 2 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-ABRIDGED & 
ANNOTATED March 2019 Update, § 4.19.14.6.4 (“The states that recognize common law 
marriages are CO, IA, KS, MT, OK, RI, SC, TX, UT and the District of Columbia.”). 
 170. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-8-5 (West) (“A marriage is void if the marriage is a 
common law marriage that was entered into after January 1, 1958.”); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 517.01 (West) (“A lawful civil marriage may be contracted only when a license has been 
obtained as provided by law and when the civil marriage is contracted in the presence of two 
witnesses and solemnized by one authorized, or whom one or both of the parties in good faith 
believe to be authorized, so to do. Marriages subsequent to April 26, 1941, not so contracted shall 
be null and void.”). 
 171. Cf. Hesington v. Hesington’s Estate, 640 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (noting 
that “§ 451.040.5 expressly declares that ‘common-law marriages hereafter contracted shall 
be null and void’” (emphasis in original)). 
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as married, and are capable of contracting a marriage.172 There are some 
differences among states permitting such marriages to be contracted; 
for example, whether a common law marriage will be presumed once 
an impediment to its formation has been removed.173 But the focus here 
is on whether a common law marriage contracted in a jurisdiction 
permitting such unions must later be recognized by a jurisdiction that 
does not permit such marriages to be contracted. State legislatures can 
specify by statute whether common law marriages can be contracted 
within the state, and whether common law marriages contracted 
elsewhere will be recognized.174 However, if a state legislature has not 
spoken directly to either or both of those issues, courts must clarify 
state law. 
Two cases, Hewitt v. Hewitt175 and Marvin v. Marvin,176 are helpful 
when examining different state attitudes about common law marriage. 
Hewitt is thought to represent strong disagreement with the recognition 
of common law marriages, while Marvin is thought to represent the 
opposite.177 At issue in Hewitt was whether Illinois would permit 
Victoria Hewitt, who “lived with defendant Robert Hewitt from 1960 
to 1975 in an unmarried, family-like relationship to which three 
 
 172. See Mark Strasser, Obergefell, Retroactivity, and Common Law Marriage, 9 NE. U.L. 
REV. 379, 406–07 (2017) (“As a general matter, individuals domiciled in a state that permits 
individuals to contract a common law marriage can establish such a union by: (1) treating each 
other as spouses, (2) holding themselves out as spouses to the community, and (3) being free to 
marry, e.g., not already having a living spouse.”). 
 173. Compare Callen v. Callen, 620 S.E.2d 59, 62 (S.C. 2005) (stating that after 
the impediment is removed—in this case, one party’s existing marriage to a third person—”the 
relationship is not automatically transformed into a common-law marriage,” but instead “remains 
non-marital”) with Thomas v. Murphy, 107 F.2d 268, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (“[T]he removal of an 
impediment while parties continue to live together as husband and wife gives rise to a common-
law marriage.”). 
 174. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.12(B)(1) (West) (“On and after October 10, 1991 . . . 
common law marriages are prohibited in this state . . . .”); id. § 3105.12(B)(2) (“Common law 
marriages that occurred in this state prior to October 10, 1991, and that have not been terminated 
by death, divorce, dissolution of marriage, or annulment remain valid on and after October 10, 
1991.”); id. § 3105.12(B)(3)(a-b) (“Common law marriages that satisfy all of the following remain 
valid on and after October 10, 1991: They came into existence prior to October 10, 1991, or come 
into existence on or after that date, in another state or nation that recognizes the validity 
of common law marriages in accordance with all relevant aspects of the law of that state or 
nation; They have not been terminated by death, divorce, dissolution of marriage, annulment, or 
other judicial determination in this or another state or in another nation.”). 
 175. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979). 
 176. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 177. Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared 
Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1843 (1987) (“Because the California and Illinois supreme courts 
had different fundamental conceptions of the nature of marriage and the law’s relation to it, their 
analyses are diametrically opposed to one another.”). 
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children have been born,” to recover “an equal share of the profits and 
properties accumulated by the parties during that period.”178 The 
Hewitts had begun their relationship in Iowa,179 although there was 
some question whether the couple had lived together there.180 
In denying Victoria Hewitt’s claim as a matter of public policy,181 
the Hewitt court discussed the state’s view of common law marriage—
Illinois by statute denied recognition to common law marriages 
contracted after 1905.182 After acknowledging the state’s policy, the 
court nevertheless explained how the family seemed to meet the 
requirements for common law marriage.183 “The parties expressly 
manifested their present intent to be husband and wife; immediately 
thereafter they assumed the marital status; and for many years they 
consistently held themselves out to their relatives and the public at 
large as husband and wife.”184 Apparently, the couple met in college. 
She became pregnant, they agreed to become a family, and “the parties 
immediately announced to their respective parents that they were 
married and thereafter held themselves out as husband and wife.”185 
The surprising part of the Hewitt opinion is that the court nowhere 
addresses whether a valid common law marriage had been established 
in Iowa.186 If one had been established, the question would have been 
whether Illinois recognized common law marriages validly contracted 
in other jurisdictions, and if not, whether the state was constitutionally 
required to do so. 
While Illinois’s refusal to permit common law marriages to be 
contracted within the state has existed for over a century, the state does 
 
 178. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d. at 1205. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ill. App. 1978), rev’d, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 
1979) (noting at one point that “the parties immediately announced their marriage to their 
respective parents, thereafter lived together as husband and wife” while noting at another point 
that “[t]he trial court . . . found that the parties had never lived together in the State of Iowa”). 
 181. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211 (“[P]laintiff’s claims are unenforceable for the reason that 
they contravene the public policy, implicit in the statutory scheme of the Illinois Marriage and 
Dissolution of Marriage Act, disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to 
knowingly unmarried cohabitants.”).  
 182. Id. at 1209 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. 1977, ch. 40, par. 214) (“The Act also provides: 
‘Common law marriages contracted in this State after June 30, 1905 are invalid.’”).  
 183. Id. at 1210 (“Plaintiff’s allegations disclose a relationship that clearly would have 
constituted a valid common law marriage in this State prior to 1905.”). 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. at 1205. 
 186. The sole mention of Iowa in the opinion involved the court’s pointing out that Grinnell 
College was located there. See id. 
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recognize such marriages if validly contracted in a sister domicile.187 
Many states have similar policies.188 If the Hewitt court had recognized 
that a common law marriage was validly established in Iowa, then 
Hewitt would likely not have stood for the proposition that common 
law marriage and nonmarital cohabitation are grave threats to 
traditional marriage,189 if only because the court would have held that 
the common law marriage was valid. 
The Illinois Supreme Court has suggested that a common law 
marriage contracted in a state permitting them will not be recognized 
in Illinois if the common law marriage was contracted while the parties 
were Illinois domiciliaries.190 But this differs from the claim that a 
common law marriage contracted in a different domicile should 
nonetheless be void.191 
 
 187. See Bangaly v. Baggiani, 20 N.E.3d 42, 82 (Ill. App. 2014) (citing Allen v. Storer, 600 
N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. App. 1992)) (“For instance, while common law marriages are not permitted 
under Illinois law . . . common law marriages contracted in another state where they are valid are 
recognized.”).  
 188. See, e.g., Brandon-Thomas v. Brandon-Thomas, 163 So. 3d 644, 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015) (citing Smith v. Anderson, 821 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)) (“Florida 
also recognizes common law marriages entered into in states that accept common law marriages, 
even though Florida itself does not recognize common law marriages contracted for in Florida 
after 1968.”); Raum v. Rest. Assocs., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343, 347–48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) 
(Rosenberger, J., dissenting) (citing Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Trans., 414 N.E.2d 657 (N.Y. 
1980)) (“While New York has not recognized common-law marriages created in New York since 
1933, it will recognize such marriages if they were valid under the laws of the states where 
contracted.”). 
 189. Cf. Kandoian, supra note 177, at 1845–46 (noting the Hewitt court’s view that common 
law marriage undermined the institution of marriage). See also Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920, 921 
(Ill. App. 1990) (citing Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211) (“In Hewitt, our supreme court held that it 
would not grant mutual property rights to unmarried cohabitants because to do so would 
reinstate common-law marriage and violate the public policy of this State.”). 
 190. Peirce v. Peirce, 39 N.E.2d 990, 993 (Ill. 1942) (“[T]he proposition that a common law 
marriage is void in Illinois, even if performed in some other jurisdiction . . . is limited to the 
situation where the parties whose marriage is sought to be upheld in Illinois were, at the time of 
the marriage, domiciled in Illinois, although the marriage occurred in another State.”). It may be 
that the trial court had based its decision on the Hewitts having been Illinois rather than Iowa 
domiciliaries, see Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d at 456 (“[P]rior to June 1960, the parties were residents of 
Illinois attending Grinnell College in Iowa.”), although the question would then be whether the 
Hewitts had become domiciled in Iowa while schooling there. See In re Estate of Elson, 458 
N.E.2d 637, 641–42 (Ill. App. 1983) (citing Schultz v. Chicago City Bank & Tr., 51 N.E.2d 140, 144 
(Ill. 1943)) (“To effect a change of domicile there must be an actual abandonment of the 
first domicile, coupled with an intent not to return to it; also, physical presence must be 
established in another place with the intention of making the last-acquired residence her 
permanent home.”). 
 191. Allen v. Storer, 600 N.E.2d 1263, 1266–67 (Ill. App. 1992) (noting that these claims differ 
and that Illinois only refuses to recognize common law marriages that had allegedly been 
contracted by Illinois domiciliaries). 
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Courts have sometimes claimed that they need not recognize a 
common law marriage validly contracted in another domicile where 
such a marriage contravenes an important public policy.192 To say that 
a jurisdiction need not recognize a marriage contracted elsewhere does 
not mean that the jurisdiction will not recognize a common law 
marriage validly contracted elsewhere.193 Just as a domicile might 
recognize out of comity the validity of a domiciliary’s marriage that had 
been celebrated elsewhere even though that marriage could not have 
been celebrated locally,194 a subsequent domicile might recognize out 
of comity a marriage that was validly celebrated in a sister domicile 
even though such a marriage could not have been celebrated in the 
subsequent domicile.195 A state recognizing marriages validly 
celebrated in other domiciles out of comity in effect reserves the right 
not to recognize such marriages if they violate local public policy.196 
However, the right to travel militates against the constitutionality of a 
state refusal to recognize a ceremonial marriage valid in a sister 
domicile at the time of the marriage.197 That same right also militates 
against the constitutionality of a state refusal to recognize a common 
law marriage validly contracted in a sister domicile. Right to travel 
guarantees require the recognition of a common law marriage valid in 
the domicile at the time it was contracted. 
B. Incestuous Relations 
States sometimes claim that they need not recognize marriages 
validly celebrated in other domiciliary states if the parties are too 
 
 192. See Brinson v. Brinson, 96 So. 2d 653, 660 (La. 1957) (“But we are not bound to give 
effect to a common law marriage, even if valid in the state where contracted, when it contravenes 
the public policy of Louisiana and good morals generally.”). 
 193. See Matter of Lamb’s Estate, 655 P.2d 1001, 1003 (N.M. 1982) (citing Ferret v. Ferret, 
237 P.2d 594, 602 (N.M. 1951)). There, the court wrote: 
New Mexico applies the rule of comity, that the law of the place where the marriage is 
performed governs the validity of that marriage. To determine whether a valid common 
law marriage was formed in a foreign jurisdiction, it is therefore necessary to look to 
the substantive law of that jurisdiction. 
 194. Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“As a matter of comity, 
Indiana can choose to recognize Tennessee marriages between first cousins, even though such 
a marriage could not be validly contracted between residents of Indiana.”). In Mason, John 
Mason had been an Indiana domiciliary before the marriage and had returned to live in Indiana 
with his wife three months after the marriage. Id. at 708. 
 195. See Brinson, 96 So. 2d at 659 (“[T]his Court has heretofore recognized, as a matter 
of comity, common-law marriages valid where contracted.”). 
 196. See id. at 660 (“[W]e are not bound to give effect to a common law marriage, even if valid 
in the state where contracted, when it contravenes the public policy of Louisiana and good morals 
generally.”). 
 197. Supra notes 159–162 and accompanying text. 
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closely related by affinity or consanguinity.198 All states prohibit, for 
example, parents from marrying their children,199 and siblings from 
marrying each other.200 States differ, however, in whether they permit 
first cousins to marry.201 
Arizona not only suggests that domiciliaries who marry their first 
cousins elsewhere (without meeting a narrow exception202) will not 
have their marriages recognized,203 but also suggests that after 1996 
individuals who marry their first cousins in accord with their domicile’s 
law will nonetheless not be recognized as married if they move to 
Arizona.204 While the constitutional limitations articulated in the 
preceding sections are compatible with Arizona’s refusal to recognize 
its domiciliaries’ first cousin marriages celebrated in accord with the 
law of the state of celebration, the Constitution does not permit 
 
 198. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-112(A) (“Marriages valid by the laws of the place where 
contracted are valid in this state, except marriages that are void and prohibited by § 25-101.”); see 
also id. at § 25-101(A)-(B) (“Marriage between . . . first cousins, is prohibited and void. 
Notwithstanding subsection A, first cousins may marry if both are sixty-five years of age or older 
or if one or both first cousins are under sixty-five years of age, upon approval of any superior 
court judge in the state if proof has been presented to the judge that one of the cousins is unable 
to reproduce.”). 
 199. Christine M. Metteer, Some “Incest” Is Harmless Incest: Determining the Fundamental 
Right to Marry of Adults Related by Affinity Without Resorting to State Incest Statutes, 10 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 262, 273 (2000) (“[A]ll states continue to prohibit marriages between parents 
and children.”). 
 200. Sonu Bedi, An Illiberal Union, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1081, 1135 (2018) 
(suggesting that no state permits siblings to marry); see also Nicole Licata, Should Premarital 
Counseling Be Mandatory As A Requisite to Obtaining A Marriage License?, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 
518, 526 (2002) (“States have enacted laws that prohibit a person from marrying his or her 
own sibling.”). But see Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978) (upholding validity of marriage 
between brother and adoptive sister). 
 201. Compare ARK. CODE. ANN. 9-11-106(a) (West) (“All marriages between . . . first cousins 
are declared to be incestuous and absolutely void”) with OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.020(2) 
(West) (“The following marriages are prohibited; and, if solemnized within this state, are 
absolutely void: . . . When the parties thereto are first cousins or any nearer of kin to each 
other . . . except that when the parties are first cousins by adoption only, the marriage is not 
prohibited or void.”); with TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-101 (West) (“Marriage cannot be contracted 
with a lineal ancestor or descendant, nor the lineal ancestor or descendant of either parent, nor 
the child of a grandparent, nor the lineal descendants of husband or wife, as the case may be, nor 
the husband or wife of a parent or lineal descendant.”). See also Smith v. State, 6 S.W.3d 512, 518 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (“The revised statutes limited prohibitions against marriage to relatives 
closer than first cousins.”). 
 202. Supra note 198. 
 203. In re Mortenson’s Estate, 316 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Ariz. 1957) (“Marriages performed 
outside the state which offend a strong public policy of the state of domicile will not be recognized 
as valid in the domiciliary state.”).  
 204. See Cook v. Cook, 104 P.3d 857, 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
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Arizona to refuse to recognize marriages validly celebrated in a sister 
domicile.205 
 CONCLUSION 
The Restatements (First and Second) of the Conflict of Laws suggest 
that a marriage valid in the domicile at the time of its celebration is 
valid throughout the country. Further, both individuals and states have 
important interests implicated in the continuing recognition of such 
marriages until ending because of death, divorce, or dissolution. Finally, 
the United States Constitution protects the right to travel, and 
individuals who must sacrifice their marriages as a price of emigrating 
to other states have had their right to travel severely burdened. The 
Constitution is best understood as requiring state recognition of 
marriages valid in sister domiciles at the time of celebration. 
The Restatements suggest that a state may withhold enjoyment of 
certain incidents of marriage if a couple’s marriage violates an 
important public policy of that state. However, the Court has not yet 
made clear as a constitutional matter which, if any, state interests are 
sufficiently important to justify such a denial. The right to travel 
enjoyed by United States citizens includes the right to emigrate to 
other states, and the Court has not explained whether states who would 
deny the incidents of marriage to new domiciliaries, or even temporary 
visitors, would thereby infringe upon the right to travel. Just as 
surrendering one’s marriage would be a heavy price to pay for the 
privilege of emigrating to another state, surrendering one’s right to live 
with one’s spouse and children would be a heavy price, too. The Court 
should explain whether and to what extent the Constitution protects 
the validity of citizen’s marriages among the states, and the ability of 
citizens to enjoy the incidents of marriage as they exercise their rights 
to travel through or emigrate to other states in the Union. 
 
 
 205. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (suggesting that right to travel guarantees 
would require the recognition of a common law marriage contracted in the domicile). 
